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PURCHASE FOR VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE
In 1887, Dean Ames published in the Harvard Law Review
(1 H. L. R., pp. 1-16) an article under the above title. In it he
put forth views novel and striking. It is the purpose of this paper
briefly to state those views and then to examine their soundness.
Three positions advanced .by him may be stated as follows:
First: If A, holding the legal title to a physical res in trust for B,
in violation of his trust, transfers the title to C, who pays value,
and, when taking title and paying value, has no notice of the trust,
he can, after learning of the breach of trust, keep the title freed
from B's equity. Second: if A owes B $1,000 and B declares
himself a trustee of the debt for C, and then, in violation of his
trust, assigns it to D, who pays value, and, when taking the assign-
ment and paying value, has no notice of the trust, D, after learn-
ing of the breach of trust, may reduce the legal chose in action to
a legal chose in possession and retain it for his own benefit freed
from C's equity. Third: If A holds the legal title to a physical
res in trust for B, and B declares himself a trustee of his equit-
able interest for C, and then, in violation of his trust, assigns it
to D, who pays value and, when taking the assignment and paying
value, has no notice of the trust, D, after learning of the breach of
trust, may reduce the equitable chose in action to a legal chose
in possession and retain it for his own benefit freed from C's
equity.
As to the first position there is no controversy. There is con-
troversy as to the second and third.
It will be noticed that, in the first position, the trust res assigned
is a corporeal thing, while in the others, it is an incorporeal thing,
being, in the second, a legal, and, in the third, an equitable chose
in action.
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In his essay entitled, "The Disseizill of Chattels" (3 H. L. R.,
pp. 23-40, 313-328, 337-346), Dean Ames has shown, thiat while
the title to a corporeal thing is transferable, the title to a chose
in action, which is an incorporeal thing, is incapable of transfer.
Consequently the purchaser of a corporeal trust res acquires title;
the purchaser of an incorporeal trust res-a legal or equitable
chose in action-whatever else he acquires, acquires no title.
We shall deal first with Dean Ames' views as to purchase for
value without notice of a trust res which is a legal chose in action
and then with his views as to purchase for value without notice of
a trust res which is an equitable chose in action.
In discussing the nature of ownership Dean Ames says (3 H.
L. R., p. 315) : "A derivative title is commonly acquired from an
owner by purchase or descent. The title in such cases is said to
pass by transfer. For all practical purposes this is a just ex-
pression. But if the transaction be closely scrutinized, the physi-
cal res is the only thing transferred. The seller's right of pos-
session, being a relation betwen himself and the res, is purely
personal to him, and cannot in the nature of things, be transferred
to another. The purchaser may and does acquire a similar and
coextensive right of possession, but not the same right that the
seller had. What really takes place is this: the seller transfers
the res and abandons or extinguishes his right of possession. The
buyer's possession is thus unqualified by the existence of any right
of possession in another, and he, like the occupant, and for the
same reason, becomes absolute owner." See also 3 H. L. R., pp.
339-340.
The foregoing language is used of a physical or corporeal res.
Obviously it has no application to an incorporeal res, to a chose
in action.
"A right of action in one person," says Dean Ames (3 H. L. R.,
pp. 339-342), "implies a corresponding duty in another to perform
an agreement -or to make reparation for a tort. That is to say, a
chose in action always presupposes a personal relation between
two individuals. But a personal relation in the very nature of
things cannot be assigned. Even a relation between a person and
a physical thing in his possession, as already stated, cannot be
transferred. The thing itself may be transferred, and, by con-
sent of the parties to such transfer, the relation between the trans-
f error and the thing may be destroyed and replaced by a new but
similar relation between the transferee and the res.. But where
one has a mere right against another, there is nothing that is
capable of transfer. The duty of B to A, whether arising ex
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contractu or ex delicto, may of course be extinguished and re-
placed by a new and co-extensive duty of B to C. But this sub-
stitution of duties can be accomplished only in two ways; either
by the consent of B; or, without his consent, by an act of sov-
ereignty. * * *
"When the substitution of duties is by consent, the consent
may be given either after the duty arises or contemporaneously
with its creation. In the former case the substitution is known as
a novation, unless the duty relates to land in the possession of a
tenant, in which case it is called an attornment. A consent con-
temporaneous with the creation of the duty is given whenever an
obligation is by its terms made to run in favor of the obligee and
his assigns, as in the case of annuities, covenants, and warranties
before mentioned, or to order or bearer, as in the case of bills and
notes and other negotiable instruments. Here, too, on the occa-
sion of each successive transfer there is a novation by virtue of
the obligor's consent given in advance; the duty of the transf error
is extinguished and a new duty is created in favor of the trans-
feree.
"The practice of attornment prevailed from time immemorial
but was confined to the transfer of reversions and remainders.
Novation, although now a familiar doctrine, was, if we except the
case of obligations running to the obligee and his assigns, alto-
gether unknown before the days of assumpsit upon mutual prom-
ises. The field for the substitution of duties by consent was,
therefore, extremely limited, and in the great majority of cases a
creditor would have found it impossible to give another the benefit
of his claim had not the ingenuity of our ancestors devised
another expedient, namely, the letter of attorney. By such a
letter, the owner of a claim appointed the intended transferee as
his attorney, with power to enforce the claim in the appointor's
name, but to retain whatever he might recover for his own benefit.
In this way the practical advantage of a transfer was secured
without any sacrifice of the principle of the inalienability of
choses in action. * * *
"By statute, in many jurisdictions, the assignee may even sue in
his own name. But it is "important to bear in mind that the
assignee under the statute still proceeds in a certain sense as the
representative of the assignor. The statute of itself works no
novation. It introduces only a change of procedure. A release
by the assignor of the debtor, ignorant of the assignment, extin-
guishes all liability of the debtor to anyone.
"So, if the assignor should wrongfully make a second assign-
ment, and the second assignee should collect the debt, he would
keep the money, and the first assignee would get nothing." (See
also 1 H. L. R., pp. 6-7.)
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Dean Ames then adds that while formerly the power of attor-
ney to enforce the claim for the attbrney's own benefit had to be
express, today it will be implied from circumstantial evidence.
(3 H. L. R., p. 341, note 2.)
"The most striking difference," says Dean Ames (1 H. L. R.,
pp. 9-10), "between property in a thing, and property in an obliga-
tion is in the mode of enjoyment: The owner of a house or a
horse enjoys the fruits of ownership without the aid of any other
person. The only way in which the owner of an obligation can
realize its ownership is by compelling its performance by the
obligor. Hence, in the one case, the owner is said to have a right
in ren, and, in the other, a right in personam."
A. owing B a debt of $I,000 payable in.money, delivers to B in
payment that amount of money and B then delivers the same to C.
A was under an obligation to B to pay him $1,000 in money and
B had a corresponding right to compel A to pay him that amount
of money. The payment to B extinguished both A's obligation
and B's right. The extinguished debt, which was a chose in
action, was replaced by a chose in possession, that is, a corporeal
thing, namely, $1,000 of money. The title to this money, this
corporeal thing, which was first in A, passed from A to B and
then from B to C, and C can enjoy the fruits of ownership of the
money without the aid of A or B or any other person.
A owes B a debt of $1,000 payable in money and B assigns the
debt to C. Here C does not, as in the last case, acquire from B
the title to $1,000 of money, a corporeal thing, which he as owner
can enjoy without the aid of any other person. Nor does he
acquire from B the legal title to the debt, as that is a chose in
action, a personal relation between A and B and, therefore, in-
capable of transfer. If, then, C acquires the legal title to nothing,
what is it that he does acquire? According to Dean Ames he
acquires power from B, as B's attorney and in B's name, to col-
lect from A $1,000 of money, and, if necessary for such collec-
tion, to sue A in a court of common law in B's name and then to
retain the money collected for his own benefit. "Retain the money
for his own benefit." What do these words signify? Of course,
when C, B's attorney, collects $1,000 of money from A, C and not
B receives the money. C, therefore, not B, has possession. The
title, however, does not follow the possession. The title to the
money paid by A to C, B's attorney, vests not in C, but in B, just
as when A pays the money to B in person. When A pays the
money to B the title and possession are united and both in B;
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when he pays it to C, B's attorney, the title and possession are
separated, the title being in B, the possession in C. But if C,
having in his possession money, the title to which is in B, is to
"retain it for his own benefit," the title to the money must pass
from B to C. As B, after assigning the debt to C, is to do noth-
ing further in person, C, as attorney for B and in B's name, must
pass the title from B to himself. Thus it is that C acquires the
right to retain the money collected by him as A's attorney and in
his possession as such attorney "for his own benefit" instead of
accounting for it to his principal B, as he would otherwise have
to do. It will be seen, therefore, that C as assignee of B, that
is, as attorney for B, acquires the power (1) to extinguish the
debt or chose in action, (2) to receive from A in lieu of the chose
in action extinguished a chose in possession, and (3) to pass the
title to such chose in possession from his principal, B, to himself,
the attorney, for his own benefit. When B collects the money
and delivers it to C, C acquires title to it. When C, as B's attor-
ney, collects the money and passes the title to it from B to himself
C acquires title to it; C's title in either case, is acquired from B.
The result in both cases is the same, though the methods by which
it is reached vary.
Assume, now, that B, when he assigns the debt to C, holds it
in trust for X, what are C's rights? If, says Dean Ames, when C
receives the assignment and pays value, he has no notice of the
trust, equity should permit him, even after learning of X's
equity, to collect the money and retain it for his own benefit freed
from X's equity. In other words, after the debt or chose in
action has been reduced to a chose in possession, which is a cor-
poreal thing, though C knows that B holds the legal title to that
corporeal thing in trust for X and that B acting in person cannot
confer on him (C) a title which he can hold freed from X's
equity, still B, acting by C, his attorney, can do what acting in
person he cannot do.
Suppose B, instead of assigning for value the debt to C, had
agreed with C for value to collect the debt and deliver the money
collected to him, and that C, when making the agreement and
paying value, had no notice of X's equity, could C, after learning
of the trust, be permitted to receive the money from B and hold it
freed from X's equity? Of course not. Change the illustration
slightly. Suppose B had agreed that after he should collect the
money, C, as his attorney, should pass the title to the money from
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B to C, could C, after learning of the trust, exercise the power
of attorney and'hold the title so acquired freed from X's equity?
The question, we submit, answers itself.
The collection by C, as B's attorney, of the money from A, is in
itself unobjectionable, even though made with knowledge of the
trust. The objectionable thing is the retaining it for his own
benefit; that is, the acquiring of title to the money from B with
full knowledge that he is acquiring title by a breach of B's trust.
A, holding the legal title to land in trust for B, borrows money
from C, and, as security, delivers to C the title deeds and also a
power of attorney to execute a legal mortgage of the land to him-
self, C then knowing nothing of the trust. 'Subsequently C learns
of the trust and executes to himself a legal mortgage. It was held
in Taylor v. London and County Banking Company, L. R., 2 Ch.
(1901), 231, that C must hold subject to the trust. The decision,
we submit, is sound.
Suppose, after B, the trustee of X, assigns the debt to C, A
pays the money to B and B delivers it to C, who receives it with
knowledge of the trust. Can he retain it freed from X's equity?
As Dean Ames bases his contention on the decision in Dodds v.
Hills, 2 H. & M., 424 (1865), we must see what that decision in-
volves. Shares of stock in a company were standing in Hill's
name. He borrowed money of Smith and, as security, executed
to Smith "a transfer of said shares" and handed it to him together
with a certificate of the shares. In fact Hills was trustee of the
shares for Mrs. Dodds, but Smith, when he received the "trans-
fer" and certificate and paid value, had no notice of the trust.
Hills having absconded and Smith, having learned of Mrs. Dodds'
equitable interest, delivered the "transfer" and certificate to the
company and was registered as owner of an equal number of
shares. Mrs. Dodds then sued and prayed that the "transfer" be
set aside or she be let in to redeem. She was let in to redeem on
payment of Hills' debt to Smith.
Dean Ames (1 H. L. R., pp: 5-6) states this decision thus:
"A -trustee of shares in a company wrongfully pledged them,
transferred the certificates and executed a power to the innocent
lender to register himself as owner of the shares. The 'transfer'
was registered after the lender was informed of the breach of
trust. (Italics ours.) Wood V. C., refused to deprive the lender
of his security."
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The context shows that Dean Ames in saying Hills "executed
a power" to Smith meant a power of attorney. The report of
Dodds v. Hills says nothing either of Hills having "executed a
power" to Smith "to register himself as owner of the shares" or
of the transfer having been registered. The V. C., it is true, says
"Smith required Hills to give him by way of indemnity, such a
power over the shares as would enable him, Smith, whenever he
pleased, to make himself legal owner. That Hills did by exe-
cuting a transfer."
This, we take it, does not mean that Smith required Hills to
execute to him a power of attorney to do anything. All that the
V. C. means is that Smith required Hills to do that which
was necessary to put Smith in a position to require the com-
pany to accept from him a surrender of Hills' shares, to issue
to him in their place a like number of new shares and to register
him as owner of such new shares, and that Hills did what was
necessary by executing the so-called transfer. There is no sug-
gestion that Hills made Smith, expressly of impliedly, his attor-
ney to do anything or that it was necessary that Smith should
do anything as attorney for Hills: to have himself substituted as a
stockholder in Hills' place.
When A holds shares of stock in a corporation he owns a
chose in action. The chose in action-is a personal relation be-
tween A and the corporation and, therefore, incapable of trans-
fer. But the personal relation between A and the corporation
can be destroyed and replaced by a new but similar and co-exten-
sive personal relation between B and the corporation. Such a
substitution is called a novation. It was a novation that was
effected in Dodds v. Hills. Smith surrendered Hills' shares to
the company and received new shares in lieu of those surren-
dered and extinguished. The personal relation between Hills
and the company was destroyed and replaced by a new but sim-
ilar and co-extensive personal relation betwen Smith and the
company. Hills ceased to be a stockholder and Smith became a
stockholder in his stead.
The decision in Dodds v. Hills cannot be understood without
understanding what must be done to effect what is called a "trans-
fer" of shares of stock in a company.
Suppose A is the registered owner of one hundred shares of
stock of a corporation, which we will call the Jones Company,
for which he holds a certificate and that he wishes to "transfer"
these shares to B.
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The Jones Company will probably have three books; one
known as the "transfer" book, another as the stock certificate
book, and a third as the stock ledger. In the "transfer" book will
be printed blank "transfers" in this form: "For value received
...... hereby assign and transfer unto ...... shares in the capital
stock of the Jones Company." The certificate book will contain
printed blank certificates with margins for entering the time of
issuing the certificate, the number of shares, the number of the
certificate and to whom issued. The stock ledger will contain
an account with each shareholder, in which he is credited with
all shares "transferred" by others to him and debited with all
shares "transferred" by him to others.
If the certificate of the Jones Company has the form usual
*today in this country, after declaring A entitled to one hundred
shares of the capital stock of the Jones Company, it will state
that they are transferable on the books of the company at its
office by A or attorney on the surrender of the certificate.
One method of "transfer" is this: A delivers to B his (A's)
certificate. A and B then go to the company's office and see the
"transfer" clerk. A signs in the "transfer" book an assignment
and "transfer" to B of all right, title and interest in one hundred
shares of the capital stock of the Jones Company. B surrenders
to the company the certificate held by him for cancellation. The
"transfer" clerk takes from the certificate book a blank form of
certificate and fills in B's name as entitled to one- hundred shares
of the capital stock of the company, has it signed by the proper
officers and delivers it to B. He then debits A in his account in
the stock ledger with one hundred shares "transferred" by him
to B and opens an account with B and credits him with the one
hundred shares "transferred" to him by A.
Another method is this: A delivers the certificate to B and
also a formal instrument of assignment and "transfer" signed by
A. This may be separate from the certificate, but is generally
printed on its back. Despite this "transfer" A still goes to the
company's office and signs an additional assignment and "trans-
fer" in the company's "transfer" book.
A third and the most usual method is this. A delivers the
certificate to B. He also signs and delivers to B a formal instru-
ment of assignment and "transfer" and power of attorney
authorizing a person, whose name is generally left blank, to be
subsequently filled in, to sign a "transfer" in the corporate "trans-
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fer" book. This enables the "transferee" to have himself regis-
tered as -owner without A's presence. The blank power of attor-
ney is generally filled in by the "transfer" clerk writing in his own
name, who thereby becomes A's attorney to sign the requisite
"transfer" in the company's "transfer" book. The "transfer"
and power of attorney may of course be separate from the certifi-
cate or, as is usual, printed on the back of the certificate.
Much information on the method of effecting what is called
the "transfer" of shares of stock in a company can be had by
consulting the case of The New York and New Haven Railroad
Company v. Schuyler et al., 34 N. Y., 30, pp. 36-38, and Cook on
Stock and Stockholders (3d ed.) sec. 375.
The question naturally arises, why does A either in person or
by attorney sign an assignment and "transfer" in the "transfer"
book of the company, after having already signed such an assign-
ment and "transfer" and delivered it to B. If B delivers to the
company the certificate and "transfer", the company has ample
authority to cancel the shares represented by the certificate and
issue a like number of new shares in their place. The reason
would seem to be one of convenience only, that the company
may have its "transfers" bound together in book form, rather
than detached from each other. The second "transfer" in the
"transfer" book is superfluous and the company may dispense
with its requirement. Indeed the writer is informed by the secre-
tary of a New York company that it has no "transfer" book; that
the person to whom a certificate is issued signs a receipt for it
in the stock certificate book, and, when a person surrenders that
certificate with a "transfer" endorsed on it bearing the same sig-
nature as the receipt, the company cancels the certificate and
issues a new one to the person surrendering the old one.
In Dodds v. Hills Hills delivered to Smith a certificate and a
so-called "transfer of said shares," and Smith delivered both to
the company. Nothing is said of a corporate "transfer" book or
of Hills or Smith or anyone else executing, any "transfer" other
than the one executed by Hills to Smith and delivered by Smith to
the company. The company, so far as appears, accepted this as
sufficient and did what was necessary to substitute Smith as a
registered shareholder in place of Hills.
What then becomes of Dean Ames' view of the decision in
D5odds v. Hills? The question whether Smith had authority as
Hills' attorney and in Hills' name to execute a "transfer" of Hills'
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shares to himself did not arise, as Hills himself had executed such
a "transfer" and the company required no other evidence of
Smith's right to be substituted in place of Hills as shareholder.
We wish not to misrepresent Dean Ames. The difficulty lies in
his lack of clearness in the use of language. In stating the de-
cision in Dodds v. Hills, he says, in language already quoted (1
H. L. R., p. 5), Hills "executed a power to" Smith "to register
himself as owner of the shares". "The shares" were Hills' shares
and of these Smith could not register himself as owner nor be
registered as owner by the company. Hills' shares had to be
extinguished and a like number of new-shares issued in their place
and it was of these new shares only that Smith could be registered
as owner. Moreover had Hills, as Dean Ames states, executed to
Smith a power of attorney "to register himself as owner" it would
have been ineffectual. For Smith could not register himself as
owner; only the company could register him as owner. A similar
want of clearness is seen in Dean Ames' further statement: "The
transfer was registered after the lender was informed of the
breach of trust." A "transfer" is never registered. Perhaps Dean
Ames means that Smith became a stockholder in lieu of Hills and
was registered as such after he was informed of the breach of
trust. If so, that was the fact. But he still leaves us in doubt
as to just what he thinks Smith, as Hills' attorney, was empow-
ered to do.
The careful reader will have noted that the word "trans-
fer" is used in two meanings. In one sense it is applied to a
formal instrument of "transfer" executed by the so-called "trans-
ferror," in person or by attorney, to the so-called "transferee" and
contained at times in the corporate "transfer" book and at times
not. In the other sense it seems to mean the completed transac-
tion by which one person is substituted in place of another as
stockholder in a corporation, which, of course, is not a "transfer",
but a substitution or novation.
In note 1 to AVilroy v. Lord, at p. 155 of his Cases on Trusts
(2d ed.), Dean Ames says: "A delivery of the certificates, coupled
with the execution of an express power of attorney to the donee
to 'transfer' the shares on the company's books, makes him sub-
stantially dominus of the shares, since he needs no further assist-
ance from the donor, and can compel registration by the com-
pany." "Nor is an express power of attorney indispensable. A
delivery of the certificates as a gift carries by necessary implica-
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tion a power to transfer the shares on the company's books."
This language coupled with the authorities cited in the note show
that Dean Ames in speaking of a "power of attorney to 'transfer'
the shares on the company's books" means a power of attorney
to sign with the "transferor's" name a formal instrument of
"transfer" such as is found in corporate "transfer" books, the
form of which has been given above. If this be Dean Ames'
meaning, then when A, a stockholder in a corporation, delivers a
certificate of shares of stock to B, with the intent that B shall
become a stockholder in his place, B, by necessary implication,
becomes A's attorney, with power to sign A's name to a so-called
instrument of "transfer" of the shares represented by the certifi-
cate from A to B and thus put himself in position to compel regis-
tration by the company as a stockholder
We can now compare the power of attorney of the so-called
assignee of shares of stock with that of the so-called assignee of
a debt. The assignee of shares has the right to sign the assignor's
name to a formal instrument of assignment and "transfer", as it
is called. Of course, as the assignor's interest as a stockholder in
the corporation is a chose in action and, therefore, incapable of
assignment and "transfer" by the stockholder, acting either in
person or by attorney, the so-called assignment and "transfer" is
not what it terms itself. It operates to assign and "transfer"
nothing. It does not even operate to create a power of attorney
in the assignee or transferee, for, ex hypothesi, it is the delivery
of the certificate with the requisite intent that makes the assignee.
the assignor's attorney. The assignee by signing the assignor's
name to the formal instrument of assignment and "transfer"
creates no new substantive right in himself. At most the formal
instrument of assignment and "transfer" is mere evidence to the
company of the assignee's right to be substituted as stockholder
in place of the so-called assignor or "transferror".
The so-called assignee of shares in surrendering to the company
the assigned shares for cancellation and extinguishment does not
act as attorney or agent of the assignor; nor, in taking title in his
own name to the new shares issued in lieu of the extinguished
shares, is he acting as his attorney. When the assignor's shares
are extinguished, the legal title to the shares issued in their stead
does not first vest in the assignor and then pass from him to the
assignee to be then retained by him for his own benefit. If, there-
fore, when the new shares are issued to the assignee he knows of
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the breach of trust committed by his assignor in making the so-
called assignment to him, he does not acquire title to the shares
by means of a new breach of trust by the assignor. "In Dodds v.
Hills," says Dean Ames, "it will be noticed, that the lender was
able to complete his title under the power without further assist-
ance from the delinquent trustee. If the lender required the per-
formance of some further act on the part of the trustee in order
to complete his title, and if before such performance he received
notice of the trust, the loss will fall upon him." (1 H. L. R., p. 6,
note 1.)
When the assignee of a debt collects it, there is no substitution
of a new debt for the debt collected and extinguished; there is
no novation. The -debt extinguished is replaced by a chose in
possession. The debtor's obligation is performed and no ob!iga-
tion remains to be performed. That is not the case where there is
a novation. No obligation has been performed. One obligation
has replaced another, but still remains to be performed. The
title to the chose in possession that takes the place of the debt,
like the title to the debt extinguished, vests in the assignor, and
must pass from the assignor to the assignee before he can retain
it for his own benefit. After it vests in the assignor and before
it passes from him to the assignee, the assignor holds the legal
title in trust and it is a new breach of his trust to pass the title
to the assignee; and if the assignee, when taking title, knows of
the trust, he participates in the breach. The fact that the as-
signor in passing title to the assignee acts not in person but by
attorney makes the act no less his act in point of law and, there-
fore, no less a breach of trust. Nor does the fact that the attor-
ney by whom the assignor acts is the assignee himself make the
act less a breach of trust. And as to the assignee, he is doubly at
fault, for he acts for both assignor and assignee in committing the
breach of trust.
Dean Ames admits that the English decisions are opposed to his
view and that the courts of New York follow the English de-
cisions, but says that a qualification is made in favor of an as-
signee whose assignor is himself an assignee under a written
assignment procured by fraud. He then cites Moore v. Mlletro-
politan, Bank, 55 N. Y.,.41 (1873), and adds: "The decision in
Moore v. Metropolitan Bank is, therefore, repugnant to the
English rule which the courts in New York profess to follow."
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The facts in that case were these: The plaintiff, Moore, owned
a certificate of indebtedness of the State of New York for $10,000
and delivered it to Miller with an endorsement signed by himself
as follows: "For value received, I hereby transfer, assign, and
set over to Isaac Miller the within described amount, say ten
thousand dollars." Miller procured the assignment by fraud and
paid plaintiff nothing. He then delivered the certificate to the
defendant bank, as security for a loan, with a similar assignment
from himself. The Court of Appeals refused to deprive the bank
of its security but permitted plaintiff to redeem on payment of
Miller's debt to the bank.
The assignment from plaintiff to Miller was a power of attor-
ney and substitution (1 H. L. R., p. 8). Miller, therefore, had
the right to substitute another in his own place as plaintiff's
attorney to collect. The substituted attorney would be as much
the attorney of plaintiff as was Miller. The assignment by Miller
to the bank was a substitution of the bank in his own place as
attorney for plaintiff to collect. A novation of powers of attor-
ney, so to speak, was effected. For such substitution or novation
the bank paid value in ignorance of Miller's fraud. The bank,
therefore, took Miller's place as assignee from plaintiff and,
having paid value in ignorance of Miller's fraud, it was in the
same legal position as if it had taken its assignment inmediately
from the plaintiff and for value. If the bank, therefore, had col-
lected $10,000 in money of the State of New York, after learning
of Miller's fraud, no reason appears why it should not retain the
money for its own benefit to the extent of its loan to Miller. The
title to the money collected before passing from plaintiff to the
bank would not be held by plaintiff as trustee and, therefore, there
would be no breach of trust in the acquisition by the bank of title
from the plaintiff. If, however, plaintiff, when he assigned to
Miller, had held the certificate in trust for X and then the bank
had collected the money and passed the title to itself from the
plaintiff, knowing plaintiff to be trustee for X, the bank should
hold the title subject to X's equity. We fail to see wherein Moore
v. Metropolitan Bank is repugnant to the English rule which the
courts of New York profess to follow.
We now pass to consider Dean Ames' views in respect to
equitable choses in action. He says the law of transfer is the
same for corporeal things and equitable obligations. "Take for
instance," he says, "the case of land. The owner may diminish
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his interest (1) by a transfer of the whole or an aliquot part of
the land either permanently or for a time; (2) he may grant a
rent charge issuing out of the land; or (3) he may charge himself
with a trust or other equity in regard to the land. If, after dimin-
ishing his interest in either of the first two modes mentioned, he
should make an ostensible conveyance of the whole land to an
innocent purchaser, the latter would take only the diminished
interest of his grantor; whereas if he should make a similar con-
veyance after reducing his interest in the third mode, the pur-
chaser would take the legal title unincumbered. No reason occurs
to the writer why a cestui que trust of land may not deal with his
interest in the obligation of the trustee in a similar way, and with
similar consequences. He certainly may transfer the whole or
an aliquot part of the obligation, and he may grant a rent charge
issuing out of it, and he may also charge himself as trustee, or
subject himself to any other equity in regard to the obligation. It
is also true that if the cestui que trust, after diminishing his
interest by an assignment, should make an ostensible conveyance
of his trust to an innocent purchaser, the latter wottld take subject
to the previous assignment. Such a purchaser would also take
subject to the annuity or rent charge. Finally, if the cestui que
trust should convey his trust after charging himself with a sub-
trust, or other equity, the innocent purchaser ought to take the
trust discharged from the sub-trust or other equity, as in the
corresponding case the purchaser acquires an absolute title to the
land. The analogy between the two cases would seem to be per-
fect."
What is said of land is not open to criticism. The owner of
land may, without doubt, diminish his interest by a transfer of the
whole or an aliquot part of the land. The transferee acquires the
title to the whole or aliquot part as the case may be. Therefore
the transferor has just so much less which he can subsequently
transfer to another. But the transferee of the whole or an aliquot
part of an equitable obligation or equitable chose in action ac-
quires the title to nothing. "The assignee of an equitable chose
in action, e. g., a trust," says Dean Ames, "of course sues in his
own name without the aid of a statute. But here, too, there is no
novation. If the Hibernicism may be pardoned, the assignee of a
trust, like an attorney, stands in the place of his assignor, but be
does not displace him. A release from the assignor to the inno-
cent trustee frees the latter's legal title from the equitable incum-
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brance. Newman v. Newman, 28 Ch. Div., 674. So, if a cestui
que trust should assign his trust first to A, and then to B, and B
should, in good faith, obtain 4 conveyance of the legal title from
the trustee, he could hold it as against A." (3 H. L. R., p. 342,
note 1.)
The assignee of an equitable chose in action, therefore, like the
assignee of a legal chose in action, acquires no title to the chose
in action assigned. He is, therefore, not a true successor to the
assignor. The assignment of an equitable chose in action, like the
assignment of a legal chose in action, also works no novation.
The obligation of the trustee to the assignor remains and is not
extinguished and replaced by a new obligation of the trustee to
the assignee. The assignor still retains the title to the equitable
chose in action and that is why he can still release the trustee or
make new assignments to new assignees.
What then is it that the assignee of an equitable chose in action
gets? He gets, as does the assignee of a legal chose in action, a
power of attorney from the assignor to reduce the equitable chose
in action to a legal chose in possession and to retain it for his
own benefit. If the assignee of a debt, a legal chose in action, in
order to reduce it to possession, has to sue, he sues in a court of
common law and in the assignor's name. If the assignee of an
equitable chose in action has to sue the trustee to reduce it to a
legal chose in possession, he sues in a court of equity and in his
own name. These, however, are mere differences of detail in the
exercise of the power of attorney. The important thing is that
the equitable chose in action is extinguished and replaced by a
legal chose in possession, the assjignee's title to which is derived
through the assignor.
There seems to be one important differenec between a legal and
an equitable chose in action. If A owes B $1,000, the obligation
of A to B is not divisible. 3 can assign the whole of the chose
in action to C, even as a gift, and C gets a power of attorney to
reduce the chose in action to a chose in possession and retain the
chose in possession for his own benefit. But if B assigns one-
half of the debt to C and C gives no value, he acquires no right
If however, C gives value for the assignment he gets an equit-
able lien or charge on the debt and may then sue in equity and
reduce one-half of the legal chose in action to a legal chose in
possession and retain it for his own benefit.
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The obligation of a trustee to a cestui is in its nature, according
to Dean Ames, divisible (1 H. L. R., p. 10, note 2). As authority
he cites Tierney v. Wood, 19 Beav., 330 (1854). Wood paid the
purchase price for land and had the title conveyed to Tierney. A
resulting trust thus arose. Wood wrote Tierney to hold the
land after his death for the benefit of certain persons. Romilly,
Mi. R., treated this writing as a declaration of trust by Wood and
the case as raising the question whether Wood was the person,
who, under the Statute of Frauds, was enabled to declare the
trust. Wood, the cestui, had nothing of which he could declare
himself a trustee except his equitable interest. He had no inten-
tion of making himself a trustee of that; but the writing operated
as an assignment of his equitable interest to the persons named to
take effect at his death. Ellison v. Ellison, 6 Ves. Jr., 656 (1802),
decided by Lord Eldon seems to rest on the same principle.
In Smith and Snow v. Snow and Others, 3 Maddock, 10 (1818),
the plaintiff, Smith, was assignee of Snow's one-seventh part in
certain funds standing in the name of the defendant trustees.
Smith and Snow sued the trustees and the other six cestuis to
have Snow's one-seventh part transferred to Smith. The other
cestuis demurred tO the bill on the ground that they were im-
properly joined as parties and V. C. Leach sustained the de-
murrer. This appears to be a clear recognition of the divisibility
of the trustee's equitable obligation.
Of course the cestui may create an equitable lien or charge on
his equitable interest but not by an assignment of an aliquot part
of his equitable interest. Thus if he directs the trustee to pay a
given sum out of his equitable interest to a person other than
himself and that person pays value, an equitable lien or charge is
created. But if the person has given no value, he acquires no
right. This last point was what was decided in In Re Lucan,
L. R. 45 Ch. Div., 470 (1890).
The statement at p. 74 of the writer's Cases on Trusts that:
"'An assignment of a part of a cestui que trust's interest creates
but an equitable charge, and is not valid without a consideration",
is not a necessary conclusion from In Re Lucan 45 Ch. Div., 470
(1890), which is cited to support it and seems to be an error.
A cestui que trust of land may, without doubt, "transfer", as
it is said, the whole or an aliquot part of his equitable interest.
But such a "transfer", unlike the transfer made by the owner of
land, does not diminish the transferor's interest. The owner of
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land, after transferring the whole, has none of his former title
left; the owner of an equitable chose in action, after "trans-
ferring" the whole, has all of his former title left. Apart from
recording acts, a second transferee from the owner of land never
acquires anything. But Dean Ames says that "if a cestui que trust
should assign his trust first to A, and then to B, and B should, in
good faizh, obtain a conveyance of the legal title from the trustee,
he could hold it against A". (3 H. L. R., p. 342, note 1). The
position of the transferor of land, in whole or in part, and that
of the "transferor" of an equitable chose in action, in whole or
in part, are not analogous. So also the position of the transferee
of land, in whole or in part, and that of the "transferee ' of an
equitable chose in action, in whole or in part, are not analogous.
It is true that, where the doctrine of Dearle v. Hall does not
prevail, when there are successive transfers of the same equitable
chose in action, just as when there are successive transfers of a
legal chose in action, so long as no assignee has reduced the chose
in action to possession and in good faith acquired the legal title
to a chose in possession, equity says the first assignee has the right
to the exclusion of the others to reduce the chose in action to a
chose in possession and retain the same for his own benefit. That
is all there is to Dean Ames' position "that if the cestui que
trust, after diminishing his interest by an assignment, should make
an ostensible conveyance of this trust to an innocent purchaser,
the latter would take subject to the previous assignment." (1 H.
L. R., pp. 10-11.) Yet if the latter, without notice of the previous
assignment, reduces the equitable chose in action to a legal chose
in possession he can hold it as against the first assignee. Is this
taking his assignment subject to the previous one?
Dean Ames says that the owner of land may grant a rent charge
issuing out of it, and that a subsequent purchaser for value, taking
a conveyance without notice of the rent charge, takes subject to
the rent charge. That is so; and it is because the rent charge is
a right in rein, a real obligation, that is, an obligation that binds
the land. He then says that a cestui que trust may grant a rent
charge issuing out of his equitable interest and that, if the cestui
que trust should afterwards make an ostensible conveyance of
his trust to an innocent purchaser, the latter would take subject
to the annuity or rent charge. In support of this proposition he
relies on Phillips v. Phillips, 4 De G. F. & J., 208 (1861), decided
by Lord Chancellor Westbury.
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The assumption underlying this position is that the rent charge
granted by the ceqtui to issue out of his equitable interest is like
the rent charge granted by the owner of land to issue out of the
land, that is, it is a right in rem, a real obligation binding not the
cestui que trust personally, but the equitable personal obligation
he has against the trustee.
A real obligation binding any chose in action, that is, a personal
relation between a cestui que trust and his trustee, has never yet
been recognized by equity and the idea finds no support in the
decision in Phillips v. Phillips or in the opinion of Lord Westbury.
Equitable rights exist and are what they are because of the
procedure prevailing in chancery. This Dean Ames has shown in
his article "The Origin of Uses and Trusts" (21 H. L. R., pp.
261-274), in which he combats the view of Mr. Justice Holmes
that the substantive law of equity is not merely the product of its
procedure. Equity acts in personam and not in rem. It com-
mands a person to do something or to refrain from doing some-
thing. Of necessity, therefore, every equitable right must be
what Dean Langdell terms "an equitable personal obligation."
(1 H. L. R., pp. 65-70.) Dean Ames himself so describes the
right of the cestui que trust against his trustee (1 H. L. R., pp.
9-10). Yet he would make an exception in the case of an annuity
or rent charge granted by a cestui que trust. How he would
describe the interest of the grantee of the rent charge we know
not. It cannot be called an equity without confusion, for that
term is confined to equitable personal obligations, and this is a real
obligation. How could equity enforce a real obligation imposed
upon a chose in action, not upon a corporeal thing?
In Phillips v. Phillips the person granting the annuity or rent
charge was the owner of an equity of redemption. The grantee
gave value. The grantor in anticipation of marriage then executed
a deed of settlement. The plaintiff was the grantee of the annuity
or rent charge and defendants were the children of the marriage
and concededly purchasers for value of their equitable interest
without notice of plaintiff's interest. But as their interest was an
equitable interest, Lord Westbury held that the fact of purchase
for value without notice was immaterial and their equitable inter-
est was subject to the plaintiff's. He speaks of the plaintiff's
interest as an annuity or rent charge, but his opinion shows that
he did not regard his interest as like that of a grantee of a rent
charge issuing out of land, namely, as a real rather than a personal
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obligation. He regarded the plaintiff's interest as an equity
created by the owner of the equity of redemption and the de-
fendant's interest as another equity created by the same person,
but later than the plaintiff's, and that the plaintiff's equity was the
better and superior simply because it was prior in time.
This is the view of the decision taken by Dean Langdell in his
Equity Pleading (2nd ed.), sec. 191, p. 222.
The annuity or rent charge so-called granted to plaintiff in
Phillips v. Phillips was nothing but an equitable lien or incum-
brance -on the grantor's equity of redemption and valid within the
doctrine of In Re Lucan, 45 Ch. Div., 470 (1890), because the
grantee paid value for it. That is, it was a right in personam,
not a right in rem.
In discussing the nature of equitable rights, Dean Langdell
says: 1. "They must not violate the law. * * * 4. They must be
such as can be enforced by the exercise of physical power in per-
sonat; for as equity has no other means of enforcing rights, it
would be in vain for it to create'what could not be so enforced.
5. Propositions one and four prove that no equitable right can be
created, even by way of fiction, in analogy to either class of abso-
lute rights, nor in analogy to real obligations."
We now pass to Dean Ames' last claim, namely, that, as the
ownership of land held in trust may be transferred discharged of
the trust to a purchaser for value without notice, so the ownership
of the cestui's equitable interest held on a sub-trust may be trans-
ferred to a purchaser for value without notice discharged of' the
sub-trust.
The ownership of land, as we have seen, can be transferred.
The ownership of the cestii's equitable personal obligation cannot
be transferred. If A holds the legal title to a physical res in trust
for B, and B declares himself a trustee of his equitable interest
for C and then assigns it to D, who takes the assignment and pays
value without notice of C's equity, D gets no title, but a power of
attorney to reduce B's equitable chose in action to a legal chose
in possession and retain it for his own benefit. D, as attorney for
B; can extinguish the equitable chose in action and receive from
the trustee in lieu of it a legal chose in possession. It may be that
the title to the legal chose in possession will pass directly from
the trustee to D, B's attorney, instead of passing from the trustee
first to B and then from B to D. But the legal consequences are
the same as if the title passed from A to B and then from B to D.
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If, therefore, B, when he gets title to the legal chose in pos-
session, knows of the trust, he takes title by a new breach of trust
and should hold his title subject to C's equity. It is unnecessary
to repeat what has been said in the discussion of legal choses in
action.
It will now be seen why it was necessary for Dean Ames to
take the view he did of the decision in Phillips v. Phillips. Any
other- view would have been fatal to his last claim. Correctly
understood the decision, we submit, is a powerful authority
against Dean Ames' view, and a powerful authority in support of
the view here put forward.
The owner of a chose in action, that is, of a personal obligation,
legal or equitable, can by compelling the obligor to perform
acquire title in the future to a legal chose in possession. When,
instead of himself compelling performance, he assigns the per-
sonal obligation, he confers on the assignee a right as against
himself to acquire title in the future to that chose in possession.
The right so conferred is a right against the assignor personally
and not against the future legal chose in possession, which at the
time of the assignment may not even exist. When the obligation
is performed and the legal chose in possession thereby comes into
existence, the assignee's right to title thereto must be made effec-
tual through his right against the assignor personally. This is
clearly seen in the case of the assignee of a legal chose in action;
for example, a debt, where the assignor refuses to permit the
assignee to sue the debtor in a common law court in his name and
he, therefore, sues in equity. He must make the assignor a party
as he must work out his right to the legal chose in possession
through his right against the assignor personally. So if the
assignor of an equitable chose in action should dispute his assign-
ment the assignee would have to join him in 'a suit in equity as
well as the trustee, since here, too, he must work out his right to
the legal chose in possession through his right against the assignor
personally. The right, therefore, of an assignee of a personal
obligation, legal or equitable, is as much an equity as the right of
a vendee of land under a contract of purchase capable of specific
performance against the vendor. That the first assignee's interest
is destroyed when the second gets the legal title in good faith con-
clusively shows it to be an equitable interest.
If now the owner of a personal obligation, legal or equitable,
assigns it first to A and then to B, he creates the same equity
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in favor of each. As A's equity is the first created he should pre-
vail over B, unless B subsequently acquires the legal title and
acquires it without notice of the assignment to A, that is, of A's
equity. If we understand Dean Ames aright, he agrees with this
position, for he says: "If a cestui que trust should assign his
trust first to A, and then to B, and B should, in good faith, obtain
a conveyance of the legal estate from the trustee, he could hold it
against A." (3 H. L. R., p. 342, note 1.) If the words "in good
faith" mean anything, they mean "without notice of the assign-
ment to A", and the insertion of these words necessarily implies
that if B should get title from the trustee with notice of the assign-
ment to A, he could not hold against A.
This concession seems fatal to both the first and third of Dean
Ames' claims. If the second assignee, by obtaining in good faith
a conveyance of the legal estate from the trustee, can destroy the
first assignee's equitable interest, then his own assignment is not
taken subject to the first assignment. If in order to destroy the
first assignee's interest, the second assignee must acquire the legal
estate "in good faith," that is, without notice of the first assign-
ment, then the assignee for value and without notice of an
equitable interest held subject to a sub-equity does not take free
from the sub-equity.
We may sum up what we have said as follows: The assignee
for value of a chose in action, legal or equitable, held in trust,
must have no notice of the trust, not only when he takes the
assignment and pays value, but also when he reduces the chose in
action to a chose in possession and obtains title to the legal chose
in possession. Otherwise he must hold the chose in possession
subject to the trust.'
I Dean Ames' view as to the position of a purchaser for value without
notice of a cestui's interest held subject to a sub-trust was approved by
Dean Langdell (1 H. L. R., p. 59, note 1). The writer, however, is in-
formed that Dean Langdell subsequently withdrew this approval because
he considered the view erroneous.
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